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Abstract—In addition to being environment-friendly, vehicle-
to-grid (V2G) systems can help the plug-in electric vehicle (PEV)
users in reducing their energy costs and can also help stabilizing
energy demand in the power grid. In V2G systems, since the
PEV users need to obtain system information (e.g., locations
of charging/discharging stations, current load and supply of
the power grid) to achieve the best charging and discharging
performance, data communication plays a crucial role. However,
since the PEV users are highly mobile, information from V2G
systems is not always available for many reasons, e.g., wireless
link failures and cyber attacks. Therefore, in this paper, we
introduce a novel concept using cyber insurance to “transfer”
cyber risks, e.g., unavailable information, of a PEV user to a
third party, e.g., a cyber insurance company. Under the insurance
coverage, even without information about V2G systems, a PEV
user is always guaranteed the best price for charging/discharging.
In particular, we formulate the optimal energy cost problem for
the PEV user by adopting a Markov decision process framework.
We then propose a learning algorithm to help the PEV user make
optimal decisions, e.g., to charge or discharge and to buy or not
to buy insurance, in an online fashion. Through simulations, we
show that cyber insurance is an efficient solution not only in
dealing with cyber risks, but also in maximizing revenue of the
PEV user.
Index Terms—Cyber insurance, plug-in electric vehicle, vehicle
charging, vehicle-to-grid, Markov decision process.
I. INTRODUCTION
One challenge of the current power grid is to provide
sufficient capacity and cost-effective energy storage. The en-
ergy storage is used as a tool by the power grid operator
to efficiently manage the generation and transmission of the
electricity, i.e., supply and delivery, to meet dynamic and
unpredictable consumer demand. A traditional approach is to
deploy large generators which can be relatively ineffective due
to its long delay response (minutes) and can cause underuti-
lization (spare capacity). In smart grid, ancillary services such
as load regulation, spinning reserve, non-spinning reserve, and
replacement reserve to support the continuous flow of elec-
tricity have been used to alleviate this problem. However, the
introduction of renewable sources, the energy supply of which
depends on natural conditions, aggravates the problem due
to the fluctuating and unpredictable characteristics. Therefore,
the vehicle-to-grid (V2G) systems have been considered as a
promising solution. In V2G systems, battery vehicles (BVs)
or plug-in electric vehicles (PEVs) can be used as energy
storage devices. Although their battery capacity is limited, they
are suitable for short-time ancillary services given their small
response time as well as lower standby and capital costs.
The effectiveness of V2G systems depends on the number
of PEVs participated and how good the data, e.g., information
of PEVs and charging stations, is exchanged between V2G
operator and PEVs in order to optimize system operations.
For example, the V2G operator can economically manage
its generators if the amount of energy reserved from V2G
systems can be accurately estimated. Likewise, the PEVs can
choose to charge or discharge their batteries to maximize the
performance and minimize the cost. However, since PEVs are
mobile vehicles and the information about V2G systems is
transmitted to the PEVs through wireless links, the V2G data
communication is unreliable and vulnerable to cyber attacks
which can violate confidentiality, authenticity, integrity, and
availability requirements of the data exchange in V2G systems.
A number of cyber risks have emerged to the V2G systems.
The majority of research works focus on mitigating the risks
by protecting the systems and preventing adverse effects from
the attacks. However, it is well known that no single solution
can completely avoid the risks and their damage. Recently,
cyber insurance has been introduced as an efficient solution to
alleviate damages for cyber customers. With cyber insurance,
PEVs’ risks are “transferred” to a third party [1], thus PEVs
are protected from cyber attacks and compensated for their
losses if they are victimized to such attacks.
In this paper, we introduce a novel idea of using cyber
insurance for PEVs in V2G systems. First, we present an
overview of V2G systems, including data communication and
cyber risks. Some related works on V2G system security
are also reviewed. We then introduce a short survey about
cyber insurance. This survey is used to provide basic concepts
as well as fundamental knowledge about cyber insurance.
Finally, we propose a novel model using cyber insurance
for a PEV user in a V2G system. Specifically, we use a
Markov decision process framework to formulate the energy
cost optimization problem with the aim of minimizing the
average total energy cost for the PEV user. In addition, we
also propose a learning algorithm to help the PEV user make
optimal decisions, i.e., charge or discharge and buy or not to
buy insurance, given its current state, e.g., battery level and
insurance status, in an online fashion. The proposed solution
not only minimizes the average total cost for the PEV user,
but also maximizes the PEV’s revenue without a need of
PEV’s prior knowledge on the risk, e.g., the probability of
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Fig. 1. V2G architecture.
information unavailability. The proof of the convergence for
the proposed learning algorithm is also provided in this paper.
Through simulations, we demonstrate that adopting a cyber
insurance model can provide an efficient solution to the cost
minimization problem for the PEVs.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II,
an overview of V2G systems and their security problems are
presented. Section III provides basic concepts and fundamental
knowledge about cyber insurance. Then, we introduce the idea
of using cyber insurance to mitigate the risks and propose the
learning algorithm to minimize the cost for the PEV user in
Section IV. Finally, future research directions are highlighted
in Section V, and the conclusions are presented in Section VI.
II. OVERVIEW OF V2G SYSTEMS
A. Vehicle-to-Grid (V2G) Systems
1) Introduction: Vehicle-to-grid (V2G) describes a system
in which plug-in electric vehicles (PEVs), e.g., electric cars
and plug-in hybrids, communicate with the power grid to
facilitate demand response services by either charging or dis-
charging energy. On one hand, if the PEVs perform charging
from the power grid, the energy will be stored in their batteries
for traveling and storing. On the other hand, if the PEVs
perform discharging to the power grid, the energy from their
batteries will be returned to the power grid with the purpose of
stabilizing energy demand [2]. For example, when the energy
supply from generators exceeds demand, e.g., during off-peak
hours, a low energy price can be offered to incentivize PEVs to
charge their batteries from charging stations [3]. By contrast,
when the energy supply cannot meet the demand, e.g., during
peak hours, PEVs can sell their energy back to the power grid.
Hence, PEVs can act as an energy reserve. As such, PEVs are
expected to potentially offer unprecedented benefits to the grid.
For example, it is estimated that ancillary services of PEVs
account for 5-10% of electrical cost, or about $12 billion per
year in the U.S. [4].
2) Architecture: Fig. 1 shows a general architecture of
a V2G system with interactions among power genera-
tion/transmission, power consumers, and PEV users [5].
The power systems include convention generators, renewable
sources, and transmission facility. The power systems supply
energy to both consumers (e.g., residential, industrial, and
business) and V2G systems. The V2G systems are composed
of PEVs connected with the power grid through public and
private charging stations and aggregators. An aggregator is
a mediator controlling and optimizing energy flow between
power grid and V2G systems. The V2G systems act as both
energy storage and consumers. V2G communication provides
data and information exchange among power systems, power
consumers, and V2G systems, and it consists of communica-
tion infrastructure (e.g., wireless networks) and processing fa-
cilities (e.g., cloud computing and data center). With the V2G
communication infrastructure, the power system operators can
collect necessary data from V2G systems and consumers, then
optimize power generation and ancillary services from PEVs
efficiently.
PEV users can make a long-term agreement/contract with
the V2G operator to make charging and discharging more
predictable. For example, the operator can offer battery main-
tenance service in exchange for PEV users agreeing to charge
and discharge the battery to meet the requirements of the V2G
3TABLE I
ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF CENTRALIZED AND DECENTRALIZED CONTROL SOLUTIONS
Advantages Disadvantages
Centralized solution • Maximize revenue for the provider and PEVs • Complex and expensive communication infrastructure
• Control energy and ancillary services efficiently • Require a powerful central controller and a backup data storage
• Require full information from the PEVs
• Decisions of the PEVs are controlled by the provider
• Must be able to handle a large amount of data at the same time
• Privacy of the PEVs can be vulnerable
• Can be delayed or interrupted due to the system overload
or cyber attacks
Decentralized solution • Able to adapt to a large number of PEVs • Require efficient decentralized control solutions for the PEVs
• Less communication and infrastructure required • Require methods to predict demands of the PEVs for the provider
• Fast and convenient services since decisions • The PEVs must find approaches to protect themselves
are made and controlled by the PEVs from cyber attacks
• Preserve individual authority
• Better fault tolerance
systems. With this approach, centralized control of charging
and discharging process can be implemented to achieve the
maximum efficiency. However, to achieve such a goal, status
monitoring and information update are necessary for V2G
systems. The V2G systems should be able to obtain the timely
conditions of both moving and parking PEVs. The conditions
can be PEVs’ locations, battery capacities, battery state-of-
charge, expected time to arrive at and leave charging stations.
Using this information, the V2G system can estimate the
amount of energy to charge and to receive from PEVs in
certain areas.
Alternatively, some PEVs can participate in V2G systems
voluntarily without making long-term commitment with the
V2G operator. For example, the operator can offer different
incentives for charging and discharging energy by PEVs
depending on current load and supply of the power grid.
The PEV user individually considers the current location, i.e.,
charging stations’ locations, the battery state-of-charge, and
energy price to decide to charge (or discharge) its battery or
not. With this approach, charging and discharging decisions
are made by PEV users in a distributed fashion. Therefore, the
V2G systems must provide information about the incentive to
motivate the users in such a way that the system efficiency is
maximized.
3) Smart charging/discharging control: As the number
of PEVs increases, implementing smart charging/discharging
control solutions has become more and more important to
avoid large expenditures and negative impacts on the power
gird. In general, charging/discharging control is classified into
two groups, i.e., centralized and decentralized solutions [6].
For the centralized solution, all charging/discharging processes
of PEVs will be controlled by an authorized energy service
provider. By contrast, for the decentralized solution, charg-
ing/discharging decisions are made and performed by the
PEVs themselves. Each solution has its own advantages as well
as disadvantages as shown in Table I. Although the centralized
approach can achieve optimal performance more easily for
both the provider and PEVs, it may not be practical to imple-
ment as the PEVs cannot control their charging/discharging
processes by themselves. Therefore, in actual systems, the
decentralized solution is more preferable [6].
4) Benefits: V2G systems offer many benefits to the power
grid and also PEV users [7].
• Diminishing environmental pollution: Different from con-
ventional vehicles using fossil fuel, PEVs can diminish
significantly environmental pollution even when consid-
ering power generation emissions. It is estimated that by
replacing a conventional car by a PEV, CO2 emissions
can be dropped by 2.2 tons per year [8].
• Enhancing ancillary services: In practice, there are many
cars traveling on the road for only 4-5% of the day, while
they spend the rest of time for parking. This implies
that we can utilize such electric vehicles to facilitate the
ancillary services in V2G systems, e.g., spinning reserves,
reactive power support, frequency and voltage regulation,
to balance supply and demand for reactive power. These
services can be used to reduce an overall cost of V2G
systems, thereby decreasing energy prices for customers
and improving load factors.
• Improving quality of services for PEV users: Due to
the development of battery technologies, V2G systems
enable very fast energy supply response time in which
the charging and discharging responses can be performed
in milliseconds. Furthermore, there is no significant run-
ning cost of the unit commitment operations. Therefore,
quality of services for PEV users, e.g., serving time, can
be improved considerably.
• Supporting renewable energy: The power quality from
renewable sources such as solar and wind generators can
be greatly improved by using PEVs as storage and filter
devices. The combination of PEVs and renewable energy
sources can make the power grid more stable and reliable.
• Rising revenue to PEV users: PEV users can receive
monetary reward for discharging energy or other support
benefits from V2G operators in participating in the sys-
tem. Thus, by adopting intelligent energy management
solutions, the PEV users can balance their demands
and charging/discharging processes, e.g., charging during
non-peak hours and discharging during peak hours, to
obtain more revenues.
5) Electric vehicle battery: Different from conventional
batteries used in electronic devices such as mobile phones
and laptops, batteries for electric vehicles must be designed
4TABLE II
BATTERY CAPACITY AND TECHNOLOGIES
Car model/EV type Battery Range Charging time
Chevrolet Volt 16kWh, Li-manganese/NMC, liquid cooled, 181kg 64km 10h at 115V AC, 15A
4h at 230V AC, 15A
Toyota Prius 3 Li-ion packs, one for hybrid, two for EV, 50kg 20km 3h at 115V AC 15A
1.5h at 230V AC 15A
Mitsubishi iMiEV 16kWh; 88 cells, 4-cell modules; Li-ion; 150kg; 330V 128km 13h at 115V AC 15A
7h at 230V AC 15A
Nissan Leaf 30kWh; Li-manganese, 192 cells; air cooled; 272kg 250km 8h at 230V AC, 15A
4h at 230V AC, 30A
Tesla S 70 and 90kWh, 18650 NCA cells of 3.4Ah; 424km 9h with 10kW charger;
liquid cooled; 90kWh pack has 7,616 cells; 540kg 120kW Supercharger, 80% charge in 30 min
BMW i3 22kWh (18.8kWh usable), LMO/NMC, 130-160km 4h at 230VAC, 30A;
large 60A prismatic cells, 204kg 50kW Supercharger; 80% in 30 min
Smart Fortwo ED 16.5kWh; 18650 Li-ion 136km 8h at 115VAC, 15A;
3.5h at 230VAC, 15A
TABLE III
WIRELESS COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGIES IN V2G SYSTEMS
Technology Operating frequency Covered distance Advantage Disadvantage Ref.
868 MHz (Europe) Easy to deploy, High interference, weak security
ZigBee 915 MHz (North America) 10-100 m require low bandwidth, short range communication, [10]
2.4 GHz (Worldwide) low power consumption high delays
Near Field Convenience, versatility, Very short range communication,
Communication 13.56 MHz 5-10 cm safer than credit cards lack of security, expensive [11]
Widely used, feature simplicity, Only connect two devices at once,
Bluetooth 2.4 GHz 1-100 m low power requirement, short range communication, [12]
low interference weak security
Popular standard for V2G systems, Unable to modify and difficult
IEEE 802.11p 5.85-5.925 GHz 500-1000 m suitable for high-speed vehicles to handle a large number [13]
and QoS-required applications, of users, no authentication [14]
high data transfer speed prior to data exchange
Similar features as IEEE 802.11p, Expensive implementation cost,
WiMAX 2-6 GHz 2-5 km but longer range communication, high power consumption, [14]
and higher data transfer speed vulnerable by jamming attack [15]
and eavesdropping
to prolong the running time with high power (up to a hundred
kW) and high energy capacity (up to tens of kWh). In addi-
tion, these batteries should have a limited space and weight.
Extensive research efforts are exerted worldwide to invent new
advanced vehicle battery techniques which are more suitable
for PEVs. In Table II, we summarize the advanced vehicle
battery technologies which are currently implemented in the
real world [9]. In Table II, it can be observed that batteries with
heavy weights usually offer longer traveling time. However, if
the battery is heavy, it will cause inefficient performance for
PEVs because the heavy battery will limit the PEVs’ speed
and consume more energy to carry. Therefore, the balance
between the performance and weight of the battery needs to
be considered for the future development of electric vehicle
batteries.
6) Data communications: In V2G systems, data commu-
nication between PEVs and V2G infrastructure is the most
crucial step to achieve the best performance for both PEV
users and V2G system operators because the operators need
information about PEVs’ demands to control the energy re-
sources distributed over large geographical areas, meanwhile
PEV users need V2G infrastructure information to optimize
their energy costs. In this case, wireless communication is the
best solution for V2G applications for many reasons.
• Mobility: PEVs are mobile vehicles, hence wireless com-
munications are the best choice because V2G systems
cannot use wires to connect to PEVs.
• Fast and convenient: Data exchanged between PEVs and
V2G infrastructure is often small in size and intermittent
over time. So, by using wireless communications, the
information will be updated timely and quickly.
• Efficiency with low cost: Wireless communications allow
data to be transmitted to multiple PEVs simultaneously
in a wide area coverage.
In Table III, we list different wireless communications
technologies which have been implemented and developed for
V2G systems. From Table III, it is observed that each wireless
communication technology has its own advantages as well as
disadvantages, and it is suitable for PEVs in specific cases. For
example, for a short-range data communication, e.g., between
a PEV and a charging station when the PEV is charging
at that station, ZigBee protocol can be adopted since it
consumes less energy for data communications. However, for
a long-range data communication, IEEE 802.11p and WiMAX
technologies should be used as they are standard protocols for
communication over long distances in V2G systems.
B. Security Requirements and Cyber Risks in V2G Systems
Although wireless technologies bring many advantages, they
also raise some security issues for V2G systems. Therefore,
5the cyber security for data communications between PEVs and
V2G infrastructure should be assured in order to protect the
smart grid from the cyber attacks such as price tampering and
system congestions by malicious software. In this section, we
discuss security requirements and some potential approaches
to deal with cyber attacks in V2G systems.
1) Security requirements: V2G systems possess the follow-
ing cyber security requirements.
• Confidentiality: Data exchanged between PEV users and
the V2G operator must be kept confidential. The identity
of PEVs users as well as their interaction, i.e., charging
and discharging, with the operator must be maintained
privately. The cyber attacks to the confidentiality of V2G
systems can cause business disadvantages to the V2G
operator if its competitor has important information about
system operations, e.g., energy price offered to PEV
users.
• Authenticity: The identities of PEVs and the operator
must be assured before and during data communications.
The operator may miscalculate the V2G system capacity
if the identity of PEVs is falsely authenticated. Authen-
tication methods taking specific requirements of V2G
systems into account have to be developed. For example,
the authentication should be customized and optimized
for PEVs [6].
• Integrity: The integrity ensures that the data exchanged
between PEVs and operator will not be modified by
attackers. The maliciously modified data such as the
number of online PEVs, battery capacity and state-of-
charge, can cause suboptimal operation or even disruption
to the V2G systems.
• Availability: Data communication facilitates a number of
functions in V2G systems. Therefore, its availability is
crucial to provide seamless and efficient data transfer
from mobile PEVs to fixed infrastructure. However, V2G
communication can be disrupted, e.g., denial-of-service
(DoS) attacks, which results in incomplete information
to the V2G operator in operating the system.
2) Solutions: Given the above requirements, V2G commu-
nication infrastructure has to be designed and implemented
accordingly. A few works have proposed different approaches
to address different issues. The authors in [7] designed a
security framework to protect the privacy of PEV users,
thereby encouraging them to participate V2G systems. In the
framework, all privacy information of PEV users and their
aggregators are sent directly to a trusted authority. The trusted
authority then adopts the ID-based restrictive partially blind
signature technique to generate public/private key pairs, and
sends them back to the PEV users and the aggregators. Based
on these public/private key pairs, the aggregators can au-
thenticate participated PEVs without knowing their identities
while the PEV users can provide V2G services with secured
information. As such, PEV users’ information is protected
from aggregators as well as from eavesdroppers since their
information is encrypted by the trusted authority. As the
method is relatively simple, its overhead is minimal. However,
the system relies heavily on the trusted authority, which can
become a single point of failure.
Different from [7], the solutions proposed in [16] considered
security for different states of vehicle’s battery. In particular,
the battery has three states, i.e., charging, fully-charged, and
discharging. At each state, the PEV user has different security
requirements such as identity, location, and energy status, and
thus the corresponding security protocols were introduced.
Similar to [7], these protocols mainly focus on the authentica-
tion between PEV users and aggregators and the confidential
information protection for PEV users. Nevertheless, in [16],
the authors also considered the data integrity issue for PEV
users through using Hash functions together with signature
algorithms. As such, the transmitted data from PEV users can
be protected from malicious modification by cyber attackers.
However, the solutions in [16] are more complicated and have
considerable overheads.
In [17], the authors discussed the jamming attack prob-
lem in smart grids as well as V2G systems. For such kind
of networks, the useful information from service providers,
e.g., energy price and locations of charging stations, may be
unavailable to the PEV users due to diverse types of jam-
ming attacks such as constant jamming, deceptive jamming,
random jamming, and reactive jamming [18]. The information
unavailability problem can cause serious damage not only to
the PEV users, but also to the service providers. On the one
hand, the PEV users are unable to find the best charging
station for charging/discharging to minimize the overall cost,
e.g., traveling and energy costs. On the other hand, the service
providers cannot maximize their profits because optimal eco-
nomic policies cannot be applied to the PEVs, e.g., offering
a low energy price in off-peak hours and/or for stations with
redundant energy. Consequently, the PEV users may not be
interested in participating in V2G systems due to the high
cost, resulting in a significant revenue reduction to the V2G
service providers.
Different approaches were proposed in [19] to deal with
jamming attacks, namely channel surfing and spatial retreats.
For the channel surfing approach, the wireless nodes will
move their communications to another channel once jamming
attacks are detected. For the spatial retreats, wireless nodes
change their locations to outside the interference range of
the jammers. Both approaches can mitigate the impact of the
jamming attacks, but they are difficult to implement in V2G
systems. This is from the fact that PEV users are mobile, and
the communication channel between the PEV users and V2G
systems are usually fixed. In [20], a new solution based on
the deception tactic to deal with smart jamming attacks was
proposed. Basically, the core idea of the deception mechanism
is using fake transmissions to undermine the attack ability of
enemies, e.g., by wasting the energy of their adversaries. Thus,
jammers may not be able to attack when V2G systems transmit
actual information. Although this solution can effectively
reduce adverse effects from smart jammers even when they
use different attack strategies, it is inefficient if the jammers
are powerful devices and have constant power supply.
In practice, there are also many solutions proposed to
address the jamming attacks in wireless networks as pre-
sented in [21]. However, they can only reduce the impact of
6the attacks. A perfect solution which can completely avoid
jamming attacks is impossible in practice. Hence, in this
paper, we introduce a novel concept using cyber insurance to
“transfer” cyber risks, e.g., unavailable information, of PEV
users to a third party, e.g., a cyber insurance company. Under
the insurance coverage, even without information about V2G
systems, PEV users are always guaranteed the best price for
charging/discharging. As a result, the PEV users’ profits will
be maximized, and thus they are encouraged to participate in
V2G systems, yielding to a considerable revenue for the V2G
service providers.
III. OVERVIEW OF CYBER INSURANCE
In this section, we present an overview of cyber insurance.
Cyber insurance is considered to be a promising solution to
“transfer” risks from stackholders, i.e., the insured, to a third
party, i.e., an insurer. Such risks include system failure and
cyber attacks which can cause damage to PEV users.
A. Definition, Fundamental Concepts, and Coverage
With the prevalent applications of Internet-of-Things, ev-
erything can be connected to the Internet by wireline or
wirelessly including V2G systems and PEVs. Internet has
brought numerous advantages, but it also involves cyber risks
including reliability and security. When such a connection is
unavailable due to system failure or cyber attacks, not only
financial losses, but also catastrophic danger to humans can
happen. Hence, we need efficient and effective solutions to
deal with cyber risks. Although there are many proposed
reliable designs and security solutions, it was pointed out
in [22] that it is impossible to achieve a perfect or near-perfect
system reliability and cyber security protection. Therefore,
cyber insurance can be considered to be a potential and ef-
ficient solution for cyber risk elimination and Internet security
improvement.
1) Definitions and fundamental concepts: Cyber insurance
can be defined in different contexts. For example, in the
Internet context, cyber insurance is considered to be a set of
policies that provide coverage against losses from Internet-
related breaches in information security [1]. In the business
context, cyber insurance is a risk management technique via
which network users’ risks are transferred to an insurance
company, in return for a fee [22]. In the market context, cyber
insurance can be interpreted as a powerful tool to align market
incentives towards improving Internet security [23]. Therefore,
in general, cyber insurance can be regarded as an insurance
product that is used to protect businesses and individuals from
cyber risks.
The followings are important fundamental concepts of cyber
insurance.
• Cyber risks: are potential threats in the cyber world which
can cause losses/damage to humans and society.
• Cyber insured: is the user/customer who wants to be
protected from cyber risks.
• Cyber insurer: is the insurance company which wants
to take users’ cyber risks together with a commensurate
profit.
• Cyber insurance premium: is the amount of money that
the cyber insured has to pay to the cyber insurer to be
protected.
• Cyber insurance contract: is the signed deal between the
cyber insured and the cyber insurer.
• Claim: is a formal request activated by the insured when
a cyber risk has occurred.
• Indemnity: is the compensation from the cyber insurer to
the insured for the loss/damage caused by cyber risks.
Basically, in a cyber insurance contract, the insured will
agree to pay the insurance premium to the insurer in order
to receive the protection from the insurer. In other words, the
insured’s risks are now “transferred” to the insurer, and the
insurer can profit from the premium and efficient management
of taking the risks.
2) Coverage: Currently, cyber insurance covers losses and
damage caused by cyber attacks to IT systems and the Internet.
In general, cyber risks are categorized into two types, i.e., first-
party and third-party, and thus cyber insurance policies are
designed to cover either or both types of risks. In particular,
the first-party insurance (www.abi.org.uk) covers the insured’
own assets, and it involves:
• Losses or damage to digital assets
• Business interruption
• Cyber extortion
• Reputational damage
• Theft of money or digital assets
Meanwhile, the third-party insurance covers the assets of
subjects which are damaged by the insured. The third-party
may involve:
• Security and privacy breaches
• Multi-media liability
• Loss of third party data
• Third-party contractual indemnification
B. Benefits of Cyber Insurance
Cyber insurance has been considered to be an alternative
solution to traditional security methods. In the following, we
highlight and discuss benefits of cyber insurance in practice.
1) Benefits to the the insured:
• Mitigate damage: By transferring risks to the insurer, the
insured’ damage will be significantly reduced when the
risks happen.
• Protected from insurers: To avoid paying high com-
pensation, the insurers have to make more efforts in
implementing countermeasures to protect the insured.
• Improve self-defense: The insured will be stimulated to
implement self-protection methods in order to reduce the
premium.
2) Benefits to insurers: According to a recent report from
the PwC Global State of Information Security Survey 2016, it
was predicted that cyber insurance market will grow from $2.5
billion in 2015 to $7.5 billion by 2020 [24]. This reveals that
cyber insurance is a promising and attractive market because
it will open many new business opportunities for insurers.
73) Benefits to third-party and society: Unlike conventional
insurance, cyber insurance requires insurers to have specialized
knowledge about cyber security as well as network systems.
This opens new opportunities for network security providers
for consultation, support, and monitoring for insurers. Conse-
quently, the development of cyber insurance results in a higher
overall social welfare [25].
C. Implementation and Effectiveness of Cyber Insurance
With aforementioned benefits, many applications of cyber
insurance were implemented in practice especially for In-
ternet security. In particular, in 1990, the first known cy-
ber insurance policy was introduced by security software
companies partnering with insurance companies in order to
offer insurance-bundled software security services (software
+ insurance services) [26]. The aim of these services is to
not only mitigate losses, but also reduce residual risks for
the insured. In 1998, the International Computer Security
Association (ICSA Inc.) corporation introduced the hacker-
related insurance packages, namely TRSecure service, to
against hacker attacks to its clients [27]. This is also known
as the first stand-alone cyber insurance service which creates
precedent for the development of later cyber insurance ser-
vices of Lloyd’s of London (https://www.lloyds.com/), AT&T
(http://www.mmc.com/), and AIG (www.aig.com) [23].
Recently, the rapid growth of cyber insurance has been
receiving a lot of attentions from the literature. Many re-
search works have demonstrated the effectiveness as well as
applicability of cyber insurance. In particular, in [28], the
authors developed an analytical model for allocating optimal
investments, and evaluated the role of cyber insurance in
mitigating the influence on breach costs. Through analysis on
impacts of insurance coverage, the authors showed that insur-
ance is able to reduce over-investments for specific security-
enhancing assets. Different from [28], the authors in [29]
adopted Monte Carlo simulation to evaluate the effectiveness
of cyber insurance. In particular, the authors simulated a
virtual company running the e-commerce site under cyber
attacks and performed around 100 million simulation trials
to estimate losses and evaluate efficiency of using cyber
insurance. Through simulation results, the authors showed that
cyber insurance can reduce the cost for the company up to
65%. In addition, there are also some other research works
studying the applicability as well as efficiency of using cyber
insurance for software security [30], university networks [31],
and Nigeria market [32].
D. Cyber Insurance Process
A cyber insurance process involves four main steps as
illustrated in Fig. 2. In the following, we will discuss step-
by-step process of a cyber insurance.
1) Risk identification: This is the first step of a cyber
insurance process. After receiving a request from a customer,
the insurer has to identify potential risks which may have
negative impacts to the customer. To do so, the insurer needs
to study the customer’s coverage requirement, e.g., first-party
and/or third-party coverage, then carries out investigations
Risk 
Identification
Cyber Risks
Customer
Risk 
Evaluation
Establish
Contract
Implement &
Monitor
Cyber Attacks
Insurer
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Fig. 2. Cyber insurance process.
based on information provided by the customer to find threats
and vulnerability of protected objects.
2) Risk evaluation: In this step, the insurer will analyze and
evaluate the risks by assessing the possibility of risks occurring
as well as their potential damage. This is the most important
step in the cyber insurance process because it will decide
how to make a proper contract. If the insurer underestimates
the risks, they will loose profits. By contrast, if the insurer
overestimates the risks, the customer may not be interested
in the insurance. However, in practice, this step is always the
most difficult step in the cyber insurance process because it
is often hard to estimate accurately the risks due to many
reasons, e.g., asymmetry information between the insured and
the insurer.
3) Establish contract: After the risks are well investigated,
the insurer proposes an insurance policy which prescribes
terms, conditions, and exclusions for the insured. If the cus-
tomer accepts this policy, a legal contract is signed between
the insurer and the insured, i.e., the customer. On the other
hand, if the customer disagrees with that offer, the insurer
and the customer can negotiate to find a joint agreement. In
the case if the customer does not accept any offers from the
insurer, the process ends here.
4) Implement and monitor: Once the contract is made, the
insurer will carry out solutions to protect the insured as well as
to minimize its damage if cyber attacks happen. The solutions
can include periodic monitoring and inspecting processes so as
to make timely appropriate countermeasures if the risks occur.
If the risks occur and cause losses to the insured, the insurer
will verify the risks and handle claims from the insured as
agreed in the contract.
E. Challenges and Solutions
Although there are many benefits and applications, cy-
ber insurance has to face some challenges which hinder its
development. In the following, we discuss some important
challenges and potential solutions proposed in the literature.
1) Risk classification: In the first step of the cyber insur-
ance process, the insurer needs to identify the cyber risks
which may cause losses to the customer and itself. However,
different from the traditional insurance, cyber risks are diverse
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CATEGORIES OF CYBER RISKS
Category Subcategory Description Elements
Actions of
people
Inadvertent Unintentional actions taken without malicious orharmful intent Mistakes, errors, omissions
Deliberate Actions taken intentionally and with intent to doharm Fraud, sabotage, theft, and vandalism
Inaction Lack of action or failure to act in a given situation Lack of appropriate skills, knowledge, guidance,and availability of personnel to take action
Systems
and tech-
nology
failures
Hardware Risks traceable to failures in physical equipment Failure due to capacity, performance,maintenance, and obsolescence
Software
Risks stemming from software assets of all types,
including programs, applications, and operating
systems
Compatibility, configuration management, change
control, security settings, coding practices, and
testing
Systems Failures of integrated systems to perform as expected Design, specifications, integration, and complexity
Failed in-
ternal pro-
cesses
Process design
and/or
execution
Failures of processes to achieve their desired
outcomes due to poor process design or execution
Process flow, process documentation, roles and
responsibilities, notifications and alerts,
information flow, escalation of issues, service
level agreements, and task hand-off
Process
controls Inadequate controls on the operation of the process
Status monitoring, metrics, periodic review, and
process ownership
Supporting
processes
Failure of organizational supporting processes to
deliver the appropriate resources
Staffing, accounting, training and development,
and procurement
External
events
Catastrophes
Events, both natural and of human origin, over which
the organization has no control and that can occur
without notice
Weather event, fire, flood, earthquake, unrest
Legal issues Risk arising from legal issues Regulatory compliance, legislation, and litigation
Business
issues
Risks arising from changes in the business
environment of the organization
Supplier failure, market conditions, and economic
conditions
Service
dependencies
Risks arising from the organization’s dependence on
external parties
Utilities, emergency services, fuel, and
transportation
and there is currently no standard to classify and determine the
cyber risks. In [33], the authors presented the first taxonomy
of operational cyber security risks with the aim to identify and
organize the sources of operational cyber security risks. The
taxonomy organizes the definition of operational risks into four
main categories with elements and descriptions as shown in
Table IV. Although the empirical information about cyber risks
in [33] is still relatively limited, the taxonomy provides the
fundamental classification of cyber risks which is especially
important in evaluating cyber risks in the second step of the
cyber insurance process.
2) Risk assessment: In the second step of the cyber in-
surance process, based on the risk analysis in the first step,
the insurer needs to evaluate the risks in order to figure
out an appropriate cyber insurance policy for the customer.
To do so, one of the most common methods used in the
literature as well as in practice is using Risk Assessment
Matrix (RAM). The insurer can create a RAM to visualize
the important areas of focus within their risk assessments,
e.g., frequency, probability, severity, speed of development,
and reputational impact as shown in Fig. 3. All of these factors
serve as important guides in understanding the holistic nature
of potential vulnerabilities and the probability of individual
risks which impact the insured.
3) Interdependent risks: Another problem in evaluating
cyber risks is the interdependence or correlated nature of
the cyber-risks. Different from conventional insurance models,
cyber insurance has to face the network security externalities
due to the interdependence of entities. Specifically, cyber
security of an entity depends on the operations as well as
security levels of other entities in the network. To deal with
this problem, insurance companies often impose insurance
Likehood
 Rare Unlike Possible Likely Almost certain 
Catastrophic Moderate Moderate High Critical Critical 
Major Low Moderate Moderate High Critical 
Moderate Low Moderate Moderate Moderate High 
Minor Very low Low Moderate Moderate Moderate 
Insignificant Very low Very low Low Low Moderate 
 
Im
pa
ct
Fig. 3. Risk assessment matrix.
policies which do not cover such kind of risks. For example,
in 2005, AIG offered cyber policies which exclude electric
and telecommunication failures. However, this solution fails
to prevent the infection spread, e.g., worms and virus, in the
computer networks. In [34], the authors adopted a general
mathematical framework to analyze policies of cooperative
and non-cooperative Internet users under cyber-insurance cov-
erage. An important conclusion drawn is that full insurance
contracts encourage cooperative users to invest more for their
self-defense, while partial insurance contracts motivate non-
cooperative users to pay more for their self-defense mecha-
nisms.
4) Adverse selection: In order to make a cyber insurance
contract with the customer, the insurer must establish cyber
insurance policies taking the adverse selection into consid-
eration. In particular, adverse selection is an information
asymmetry problem between the insured and the insurer where
the insured has a complete awareness about his/her situation,
while the insurer does not know, and thus it leads to the
adverse selection problem for the insurer. To protect the insurer
from this problem, insurance companies typically require
their clients to have a current situation certification, e.g., life
insurance companies require their clients to take certificated
9medical examinations. However, this problem becomes more
difficult for cyber-risk insurance because there is currently no
safety standardization for cyber systems.
In order to deal with this problem, an insurance firm, called
J.S. Wurzler, proposed insurance contracts to cover damage
caused by hackers’ attacks with additional fee for clients using
Microsoft’s NT software [1]. However, this is not an effective
solution since cyber risks are not only governed by the
insured’s security system, but also by many cyber incidents,
e.g., insured objects and their relations. As an effort to address
this problem, the authors in [35] introduced a model to link
cyber incidents and risks with security insurance policies.
Specifically, they developed a model, namely semantic cyber
incident classification, which adopts semantic techniques to
build a consistent and convincing knowledge representation for
entities in cyber insurance system. Nevertheless, the authors
did not consider all entities, and thus relations in cyber
insurance need to be further investigated.
5) Moral hazard: The second major challenge in designing
cyber insurance policies is moral hazard that refers to the
problem when the insured under the insurance coverage relies
on insurance contracts and pays less attention in preventing
cyber risks. To prevent the insured from free-riding, a typical
way is to issue additional terms for insurance contracts. For
example, INSUREtrust (http://www.insuretrust.com/) offers a
policy “You agree to protect and maintain your computer
system and your e-business information assets and e-business
communications to the level or standard at which they existed
and were presented...”, or Lloyd’s of London insurance com-
pany requires “The inured company maintains system security
levels that are equal to or superior to those in place as at the
inception of this policy”.
However, these solutions do not encourage users in im-
proving network security, thereby raising cyber risks for both
the insurer and the insured. Thus, promotion policies can
be used to handle this problem. For example, AIG provides
discounts for clients who use Invicta Network’s security de-
vices or Lloyd’s of London offers promotions for firms using
Tripwire’s Integrity security software. Nevertheless, different
clients have different risk levels, and thus we cannot ap-
ply the same promotion for all clients. It was pointed out
in [22] that for monopolistic cyber insurance contracts without
client discrimination, there always exists an inefficient market
in which the social welfare of users is not maximized at
Nash equilibrium. However, if clients’ discriminating premium
policies are applied, the moral hazard problem is mitigated,
thereby maximizing the overall network security.
6) Setting premium: This is the last step before an insurance
contract is signed. There are two typical ways to determine the
premium for an insurance contract in practice, i.e., through ac-
tuarial data and normative standards. However, both ways are
unable to apply to the cyber insurance because cyber insurance
is relatively new and there is currently no standard to establish
cyber insurance premiums, while cyber actuarial data is not
available since many companies are either unaware of a cyber
attack or unwilling to disclose such attacks. Furthermore, there
are also some other challenges in setting premiums for cyber
contracts as pointed out in [36], e.g., underwriting process
and premium-setting produces, and thus the authors suggested
a research agenda developed by three main directions, i.e.,
policy, management, and technology.
7) Other problems: There are also other problems which
have been also studied in the literature for the development of
cyber insurance. For example, in [37], the authors examined
the applicability of prediction markets [38] in forecasting and
assessing information security events. In practice, prediction
markets can be used as an efficient tool to improve aggre-
gation of information, thereby improving the process of risk
assessment and risk mitigation. In [39], a financial mechanism
was introduced to incentivize coordinated efforts by security
stakeholders in improving the information security ecosystem.
The proposed solution is expected to address the problem of
information asymmetry, negative externality and free riding
for the insurer, and to negotiate a lower premium for the
insured. In [40], a consumer pricing mechanism was examined
to improve the profit for the insurer when a security vendor
becomes a cyber-insurer. Through the simulation results, the
authors showed that by using the proposed method, the secu-
rity vendor’s profit can be raised up to 25%.
F. Cyber Insurance Models
Cyber risks are becoming more and more exacerbated to
business and society, while countermeasures are still limited
due to many reasons, e.g., information asymmetry and the
complexity of cyber networks. Therefore, to attain efficient
solutions, cyber insurance models which can quantify risks
and measure effectiveness of cyber security and risk manage-
ment strategies need to be taken into consideration. In this
section, we discuss cyber insurance models with the aim of
investigating the different characteristics offered by the insurer
which tend to maximize the total outcome of the insurer as
well as the insured.
1) Classical model: We consider a classical model for
cyber insurance in which an agent (i.e., the insured) attempts
to maximize its utility function u[.]. The agent is assumed to
be rational and risk averse, i.e., its utility function is concave
as shown in Proposition 2.1 in [41]. We denote w0 as the
initial wealth of the agent, pi as the risk premium which is
defined by the maximum amount of money that the agent is
ready to pay to eliminate a pure risk X (i.e., E(X) = 0), l
as the potential loss of the agent caused by risk X which is
assumed to be a fixed value, and p as the probability of loss.
Then, the amount of money m which the agent is ready to
invest to eliminate the risk X is derived as follows:
pu[w0 − l] + (1− p)u[w0] = u[w0 −m]. (1)
Then, from the results obtained in [42], we can derive the
value of m as follows:
m = pl + pi[p], (2)
where pi[p] is the risk premium when the loss probability
equals p, and the term pl represents the fair premium, i.e.,
the expected loss. The relation of terms in (1) and in (2) can
be seen clearer in Fig. 4.
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TABLE V
THE EXPECTED PAYOFF MATRIX
Agent 2: Self-protection (S) Agent 2: No-Protection (N)
Agent 1: Self-protection (S) u[w0 − c] (1− pq)u[w0 − c] + pqu[w0 − c− l]
Agent 1: No-protection (N) (1− p)u[w0] + pu[w0 − l] pu[w0 − l] + (1− p)(pqu[w0 − l] + (1− pq)u[w0])
w
u
u[w0]
u[w0 - l]
w0
w0 - l
pl
m
l
π[p]
Concave function
u[w0 - m]
Fig. 4. Utility function.
For the classical cyber insurance model, m can be expressed
as the maximum acceptable premium for full coverage. This
implies that if the insurer offers a full coverage with premium
Ω, the agent will accept the offer if Ω ≤ m. Thus, it can be
observed that the premium Ω depends on the distribution of
the loss, i.e., p and l, and the existence of the insurance market
will be determined by three parameters, i.e., u, l, and p.
2) Cyber insurance with self-protection: In [43], a cyber
insurance model with self-protection for the insured was
introduced. Different from the classical model where the agent
has only two options, i.e., either purchase or do not purchase
insurance, in the self-protection model, the agent has three
options, i.e., self-protection, purchase insurance, or do not
purchase. First, in the case without insurance, the agent has
to decide whether to buy insurance or not. If we denote c
as the cost of self-protection and p[c] as the corresponding
probability of loss, we need to find the optimal value of c∗ to
maximize the following utility function:
max
c
f(c) = p[c]u[w0 − l − c] + (1− p[c])u[w0 − c)]. (3)
Obviously, when the agent invests money to protect itself, it
will expect a lower probability of loss, and thus it is reasonable
to assume that p[c] is a non-increasing function of c. As a
result, the optimization problem in (3) has a unique solution,
i.e., either 0 or ct, as demonstrated in [43]. The authors
then showed that if the cost for self-protection is less than a
predefined threshold c†, then the agent will invest ct for self-
protection. Otherwise, it will not invest for self-protection.
Now, given the cyber insurance, the agent will have more
choices. In the first case when c < c†, i.e., the agent will
invest ct for self-protection, if the cost to buy insurance c(Ω)
is less than ct, the agent will buy insurance instead of investing
for self-protection. Otherwise, if c(Ω) > ct, the agent will
invest for self-protection only. In the second case when c ≥ c†,
i.e., the agent will not invest for self-protection, the model
becomes the classical model where the agent has to decide to
buy insurance or not, and we can use analysis in the previous
section to find the optimal strategy for the agent.
In general cases of cyber insurance with self-protection,
the agent can choose a hybrid solution for self-protection
and purchasing insurance. Specifically, the agent can invest a
portion of cost, i.e., γc, for self-protection, and the rest of cost,
i.e., (1−γ)c, for insurance based on its demands. For example,
for companies with good security system, it may invest more
money for self-protection, and less money for insurance. In
this case, the optimal value of γ will be determined by
the cost function of self-protection and insurance as shown
in [43]. However, for cyber insurance models with partial self-
protection, the insurer has to face the moral hazard problem
because when the agent is covered by insurance, it may take
fewer measures to prevent losses. In this case, the insurer
should tie up the premium to the amount of self-protection
to avoid moral hazard behaviors from the insured [44].
Obviously, cyber insurance models with self-protections
bring more flexible and appropriate insurance policies for the
agent compared with the classical model. Nevertheless, it was
also highlighted in [43] that there are still many difficulties
as well as challenges in developing self-protection strategies
in cyber insurance because the level of self-protection of the
agent is still representing a complex and time-intensive task.
3) Interdependent model: In [45], the authors introduced a
cyber insurance model for interdependent security (IDS) for
the case with only two agents, and these agents have to face
interdependent risk problem in the same network. In the IDS
model, agents have to decide whether or not to invest in self-
protection given a risk of losses which depends on the state
of the other agents in the network. There are two causes of
losses for an agent. The loss can be caused by an agent itself,
i.e., direct loss, with probability p, and this loss can be caused
by the other agents in the network, i.e., indirect loss, with
probability q. Then, the utility function for these two agents
can be determined as shown in Table V. Here, it is assumed
that two agents are symmetric and p and q are independent
parameters.
Denote c1 = pl + pi[p] and c2 = p(1 − pq)l + pi[p + (1 −
p)pq]− pi[pq], then by using game theory, the authors in [43]
showed the following results:
• If c ≤ c2: The Nash equilibrium of the game is (S,S),
i.e., both agents will invest in self-protection.
• If c2 < c ≤ c1: Both equilibria, i.e., (S,S) and (N,N), are
possible and thus there is no Nash equilibrium solution
for this game.
• If c1 < c: The Nash equilibrium of the game is (N,N),
i.e., both agents will not invest in self-protection.
Then, the authors integrated aforementioned analysis results
into the insurance model in which the agents can choose
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whether to invest in self-protection and/or in a full coverage
insurance. In this case, each agent will have three actions, i.e.,
purchase insurance, invest in self-protection, or do nothing,
and similar to the case without insurance, the expected payoff
matrix can be built and game theory can be adopted to
analyze the Nash equilibrium solution for this IDS game with
insurance. This model then can be extended to the case with
N agents with different kinds of network topoloty [43] and/or
to the case with partial insurance coverage [34].
There were also some other cyber insurance models studied
in the literature. For example, the authors in [46] introduced a
cyber insurance model to deal with the information asymmetry
problem; Aegis model was introduced in [47] to deal with
the case when the agent cannot discriminate between types
of losses and risks; and Copulas was proposed in [48] to
forecast the value of losses and allow a proper pricing of cyber
insurance. Each model has its own advantages and can be used
in specific circumstances depending on the agent’s situation.
G. Evolution of Cyber Insurance Market
Over the last two decades, the cyber insurance market has
experienced great development steps with huge revenues for
insurance companies. However, the cyber insurance market is
still under the expectations. The reason is that cyber insurance
companies mainly focus on exploiting conventional security
market, i.e., Internet security market, which is gradually sat-
urated due to the fierce competition among insurers. Thus,
exploring new markets will be a potential solution for the
development of cyber insurance in the future.
Recently, the rapid development of social networks and
cloud computing has opened a great opportunity for cyber
insurance. In particular, in early 2011, INSUREtrust imple-
mented the social media insurance package which allows
social media companies to tailor the cover they buy to the
risks they face. This insurance policy covers many problems
related to the social networks such as defamation including
libel and slander, intellectual property rights infringement,
and so on. In 2013, the first cloud insurance platform was
introduced by Cloudinsure (http://www.cloudinsure.com) to
specifically address emerging privacy and security risks within
the cloud environment. In the literature, there were a couple
of research works proposing the idea of using cyber insurance
to cloud security. In particular, the authors in [49] proposed
a framework for cloud customers to manage the allocation of
cloud security services and cyber insurance. The main aim of
this framework is to maximize the profits for customers using
cloud services, while minimizing their risks through insurance
policies and their costs incurred in the process of using cloud
services. Alternatively, a framework was introduced in [50] to
reduce the implement cost, while remaining the security level
for cyber insurance contracts. The core idea of [50] is using
big data techniques to improve cyber security levels without
a need of increasing financial budget.
It is clear that there are still many potential markets which
insurers can benefit, and this is the motivation for us to
introduce a novel framework using cyber insurance in V2G
systems. In the next section, we will show that cyber insurance
is an efficient solution to address the cyber risks and optimize
the benefit for PEV users. In addition, V2G systems are
potential markets for cyber insurance companies.
IV. RISK MIGRATION THROUGH CYBER INSURANCE IN
PEV CHARGING AND DISCHARGING
A. System Model
1) PEV charging/discharging and V2G systems: We con-
sider a V2G system in which a PEV user obtains the in-
formation about the energy price and the location of the
charging stations through a V2G communication infrastruc-
ture. Different charging stations may have different prices at
different time due to various factors, e.g., supply of renewable
energy, consumer demand, and market influence. Therefore,
based on the information provided by the V2G communication
infrastructure, the PEV user can find the charging station
which yields the lowest cost for charging or the highest profit
for discharging. The cost for charging includes traveling cost
and charging fee, while the profit for discharging equals the
revenue obtained from discharging minus the traveling cost.
Time is divided into P periods, e.g., morning, afternoon,
evening, and night. Thus, with the information about the
charging stations, the cost (per unit of energy) to replenish
energy for the PEV user in period p is denoted by ccp, and
ccp ≥ 0,∀p = 1, . . . , P . Similarly, we denote by cdp the
discharging cost in the period p. However, different from ccp,
cdp ≤ 0,∀p = 1, . . . , P since it represents the revenue of the
PEV user. In practice, the information about charging stations
may not be available to the PEV user for many reasons such
as network failure and/or cyber attacks. Thus, if the PEV user
decides to charge or discharge in period p without information
about charging stations, the cost for charging, denoted by Ccp,
could be higher, i.e., ccp ≤ Ccp, and the cost for discharging,
denoted by Cdp , could also be higher, i.e., c
d
p ≤ Cdp .
Furthermore, we denote lp as the probability when the
V2G communication infrastructure is unavailable in period p.
Moreover, the PEV user has a battery with fixed capacity,
denoted by B, and hence the energy storage is divided into B
levels, i.e., 1, 2, . . . , B.
2) Cyber insurance for PEV charging and discharging: For
V2G systems, when the information about charging stations is
unavailable, there will be a risk to the PEV user. In particular,
the PEV user may receive a higher cost for charging and a
lower revenue for discharging. Therefore, we introduce the
idea of using cyber insurance to transfer the risk from the
PEV user, i.e., an insured, to an insurer who provides the price-
guaranteed service. The insurer can be a third party, e.g., an
insurance company, or in a form of extra services offered by
the company owning charging stations and aggregators. The
PEV user can buy the insurance by paying a premium, denoted
by m. The insurer will then issue an insurance which is valid
for a period of time to reserve the best price for the PEV
user. In particular, if the PEV is under the insurance coverage,
and it wants to be charged or discharged, the PEV user will
pay the cost of ccp or c
d
p, respectively, no matter whether the
information about the charging stations is available or not.
However, if the PEV user is not covered by the insurance
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and the information infrastructure is not available, the PEV
user will incur the cost of Ccp or C
d
p , if it wants to charge
or discharge, respectively. Again ccp ≤ Ccp and cdp ≤ Cdp as
discussed in the previous section.
In Fig. 5, we show the system model of PEV charg-
ing/discharging and the cyber insurance which involves five
main steps as follows.
• Firstly, the energy price information is collected from all
charging stations at the energy price database.
• Secondly, the information is transmitted to the PEV user
through V2G communication channels.
• Thirdly, the PEV user considers its battery level and uses
the information to choose a suitable charging station.
• Fourthly, the PEV user can also choose to buy an insur-
ance from the insurer by paying a certain premium to
guarantee low charging fee and high discharging price.
• Fifthly, if the V2G communication infrastructure is not
available, the PEV user can still charge the battery with
the guaranteed price while the extra cost is covered by
the indemnity paid by the insurer.
Charging stations
Insured
PHEV
Insurer
V2G communication
Energy price 
database
PHEVs
Energy price 
information
1
2
3
5
4
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Discharging
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Fig. 5. Cyber insurance for PEV charging.
From Fig. 5, given the current state, the PEV user has to
make two concurrent decisions. First, the PEV should charge,
discharge, or do nothing in the current period. Second, the PEV
should buy insurance or not. If the PEV buys insurance in this
period, it will be guaranteed the best price for charging and
discharging in next ν periods. The objective of the PEV user
is to minimize the total cost, i.e., energy cost and insurance
cost. To obtain optimal decisions, in the following, we will
formulate a stochastic optimization problem based on Markov
decision process (MDP).
B. Problem Formulation
1) State space: We define the state space of the PEV user
as follows:
S , B × P × I, (4)
where × is the Cartesian product, b ∈ B = {1, . . . , B} is the
battery level of the PEV user, p ∈ P = {1, . . . , P} represents
the time period, and i ∈ I = {0, 1} expresses the current
insurance status of the PEV user. Thus, the state of the PEV
user is then defined as a composite variable s = (b, p, i) ∈ S.
2) Action space: The action space is defined by:
A , A1 ×A2, (5)
where a1 ∈ A1 = {0, 1, 2}, a2 ∈ A2 = {0, 1}, and they can
be defined as follows:
a1 =

0, if the PEV user does neither charging nor
discharging,
1, if the PEV user performs charging,
2, if the PEV user performs discharging,
(6)
and
a2 =
{
0, if the PEV user does not buy insurance,
1, if the PEV user buys insurance. (7)
While choosing a2 depends on the demand of the PEV user
only, i.e., the PEV can choose either to buy or not to buy at any
period without concerning its current state, a1 must be selected
based on the current state of the PEV user. For example, when
the current battery level is zero, the PEV user cannot choose
action “discharging”. Therefore, the action space A1 can be
redefined as follows:
A1 =
 {0, 1}, if b = 0,{0, 1, 2}, if b > 0 and b < B,{0, 2}, if b = B. (8)
3) Immediate cost function: We denote fc as the immediate
cost function for the PEV user, and it can be defined depending
on different cases as shown in Fig. 6. In Fig. 6, when the
battery level is zero, i.e., b = 0, if the PEV user takes action
“do nothing”, i.e., a1 = 0, then the PEV user will receive a
heavy cost h1 or h2 corresponding to the cases when the PEV
user is not under or under the insurance coverage, respectively.
These costs are to prevent the PEV user from the energy
depletion status, and in general we have h2 > h1. In Fig. 6,
IA and IU stand for “insurance is available” and “insurance is
unavailable”, respectively.
In this paper, we aim to find the optimal policy Ψ∗ to
minimize the expected average cost of the PEV user in a long
run which can be defined as follows:
min
Ψ
C(Ψ) = lim
T→∞
1
T
EΨ
[
T∑
t=1
fc
(
st,Ψ(at)
)]
, (9)
where st and at are the state and action at the t-th time period,
respectively.
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Fig. 6. Immediate cost function.
C. Optimal Policy with Learning Algorithm
In our considered system, cyber risks are random and un-
predicted, and thus it is intractable to estimate the probability
of cyber risks at each time period, i.e., lp. As a result, we are
unable to derive the transition probability matrix to find the
optimal policy for the PEV user. Therefore, in this section, we
introduce a learning algorithm based on the simulation-based
method to help the PEV user make optimal decisions in an
online fashion.
1) Parameterized policy: We consider a randomized pa-
rameterized policy which is well studied in the literature [51],
[52], [53]. Under the randomized parameterized policy, when
the PEV user is at state s, it will select action a with the
probability µΘ(s, a) as follows:
µΘ(s, a) =
exp(θs,a)∑
ai∈A exp(θs,ai)
, (10)
where Θ = {θs,a ∈ R} is the parameter vector of the PEV
user. Furthermore, every µΘ(s, a) must not be negative and∑
a∈A µΘ(s, a) = 1.
Under the randomized parameterized policy µΘ(s, a), the
transition probability function will be parameterized as fol-
lows:
pb(s
′|s,Ψ(Θ)) =
∑
a∈A
µΘ(s, a)pb(s
′|s, a), (11)
for all s, s′ ∈ S , and pb(s′|s, a) is the transition probability
from state s to state s′ when action a is taken. Similarly,
we have the parameterized immediate cost function defined as
follows:
fc(s,Θ) =
∑
a∈A
µΘ(s, a)fc(s, a). (12)
Our objective is to minimize the average cost of the PEV
user under the randomized parameterized policy µΘ(s, a),
which is denoted by Ψ(Θ). Then we make some necessary
assumptions as follows.
Assumption 1. The Markov chain is aperiodic and there exists
a state s∗ which is recurrent for each of such Markov chain.
Assumption 2. For every state pair s, s′ ∈ S, the transition
probability function pb(s′|s,Ψ(Θ)) and the immediate cost
function fc(s,Θ) are bounded, twice differentiable, and have
bounded first and second derivatives.
Assumption 1 implies that the system has a Markov prop-
erty, and Assumption 2 ensures that the transition probability
function and the immediate cost function depend “smoothly”
on the parameter vector Θ. Then, we can define the parame-
terized average cost (i.e., the cost under the parameter vector
Θ) by
C(Θ) = lim
T→∞
1
T
EΘ
[ T∑
t=0
fc(st,Θ)
]
, (13)
where st is the state of the PEV user at time step t. EΘ[·] is the
expectation under parameter vector Θ. Under Assumption 1,
the average cost C(Θ) is well defined for every Θ, and does
not depend on the initial state Θ0. Moreover, we have the
following balance equations∑
s∈S
piΘ(s)pb(s
′|s,Ψ(Θ)) = piΘ(s′),∀s′ ∈ S,∑
s∈S
piΘ(s) = 1, (14)
where piΘ(s) is the steady-state probability of state s under the
parameter vector Θ. These balance equations have a unique
solution defined as a vector ΠΘ =
[ · · · piΘ(s) · · · ]>.
Then, the average cost can be expressed as follows:
C(Θ) =
∑
s∈S
piΘ(s)fc(s,Θ). (15)
2) Policy gradient method: We define the differential cost
d(s,Θ) at state s by
d(s,Θ) = EΘ
T †−1∑
t=0
(fc(st,Θ)− C(Θ)) |s0 = s
 , (16)
where T † = min{t > 0|st = s∗} is the first future time that
state s∗ is visited. Here, it is worth to note that, the main
aim of defining the differential cost d(s,Θ) is to represent the
relation between the average cost and the immediate cost at
state s, instead of the recurrent state s∗. Additionally, under
Assumption 1, the differential cost d(s,Θ) is a unique solution
of the Bellman equation defined as follows:
d(s,Θ) = fc(s,Θ)− C(Θ) +
∑
s′∈S
pb(s
′|s,Ψ(Θ))d(s′,Θ),
(17)
for all s ∈ S. Then, we propose Proposition 1 to calculate the
gradient of the average cost as follows:
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Proposition 1. Let Assumption 1 and Assumption 2 hold, then
∇C(Θ) =
∑
s∈S
piΘ(s)
(
∇fc(s,Θ)+
∑
s′∈S
∇pb(s′|s,Ψ(Θ))d(s′,Θ)
)
.
(18)
Proposition 1 represents the gradient of the average cost
C(Θ), and the proof of Proposition 1 is provided in Ap-
pendix A.
3) An idealized gradient algorithm: Using Proposition 1,
we can formulate the idealized gradient algorithm based on
the form proposed in [54] given as follows:
Θt+1 = Θt − ρt∇C(Θt), (19)
where ρt is a step size and ∇C(Θt) is the gradient of
average cost function. Under a suitable step size satisfying
Assumption 3 and Assumption 1 is hold, it is proved that
limt→∞∇C(Θt) = 0 and thus C(Θt) converges [54].
Assumption 3. The step size ρt is deterministic, nonnegative
and satisfies the following conditions,
∞∑
t=1
ρt =∞, and
∞∑
t=1
(ρt)
2 <∞. (20)
4) Learning algorithm: The idealized gradient method can
minimize the average cost C(Θ), if we can calculate the
gradient of the function C(Θt) with respect to Θ at each
time step. However, if the system has a large state space, it is
impossible to compute the exact gradient of C(Θt). Therefore,
we alternatively consider an approach that can estimate the
gradient of C(Θt) and update parameter vector Θ accordingly
in an online fashion.
Since
∑
a∈A µΘ(s, a) = 1, we can derive that∑
a∈A∇µΘ(s, a) = 0 for every Θ. From (12), we have
∇fc(s,Θ) =
∑
a∈A
∇µΘ(s, a)fc(s, a)
=
∑
a∈A
∇µΘ(s, a)
(
fc(s, a)− C(Θ)
)
,
(21)
since
∑
a∈A∇µΘ(s, a) = 0.
Moreover, we have
∑
s′∈S
pb(s
′|s,Ψ(Θ))d(s′,Θ)
=
∑
s′∈S
∑
a∈A
∇µΘ(s, a)pb(s′|s, a)d(s′,Θ),
(22)
for all s ∈ S.
Therefore, along with Proposition 1, we can derive the
gradient of C(Θ) as follows:
∇C(Θ) =
∑
s∈S
piΘ(s)
(
∇fc(s,Θ) +
∑
s′∈S
∇pb(s′|s,Ψ(Θ))d(s′,Θ)
)
=
∑
s∈S
piΘ(s)
(∑
a∈A
∇µΘ(s, a)
(
fc(s, a)− C(Θ)
)
+
∑
s′∈S
∑
a∈A
∇µΘ(s, a)pb(s′|s, a)d(s′,Θ)
)
=
∑
s∈S
piΘ(s)
∑
a∈A
∇µΘ(s, a)
((
fc(s, a)− C(Θ)
)
+
∑
s′∈S
pb(s
′|s, a)d(s′,Θ)
)
=
∑
s∈S
∑
a∈A
piΘ(s)∇µΘ(s, a)qΘ(s, a),
where
qΘ(s, a) =
(
fc(s, a)− C(Θ)
)
+
∑
s′∈S
pb(s
′|s, a)d(s′,Θ)
= EΘ
[
T †−1∑
t=0
(
fc(st, at)− C(Θ)
)|s0 = s, a0 = a].
(23)
Here, qΘ(s, a) can be interpreted as the differential cost if
action a is taken based on policy µΘ at state s. Then, we
present Algorithm 1 that updates the parameter vector Θ at
the visits to the recurrent state s∗.
Algorithm 1 Algorithm to update the parameter vector Θ at
the visits to the recurrent state s∗
At the time step tm+1 of the (m + 1)th visit to state s∗, we
update the parameter vector Θ and the estimated average cost
ψ˜ as follows:
Θm+1 = Θm − ρmFm(Θm, ψ˜m), (24)
ψ˜m+1 = ψ˜m + κρm
tm+1−1∑
t′=tm
(
fc(st′ , at′)− ψ˜m
)
, (25)
where
Fm(Θm, ψ˜m) =
tm+1−1∑
t′=tm
q˜Θm(st′ , at′)
∇µΘm(st′ , at′)
µΘm(st′ , at′)
, (26)
q˜Θm(st′ , at′) =
tm+1−1∑
t=t′
(
fc(st, at)− ψ˜m
)
. (27)
In Algorithm 1, κ is a positive constant and ρm is a
step size that satisfies Assumption 3. The term Fm(Θm, ψ˜m)
represents the estimated gradient of the average cost, and it
is calculated by the cumulative sum of the total estimated
gradient of the average cost between two successive visits
(i.e., the mth and (m + 1)th visits) to the recurrent state
s∗. Furthermore, ∇µΘm(st′ , at′) expresses the gradient of the
randomized parameterized policy function that is provided
in (10). Algorithm 1 enables us to update the parameter vector
Θ and the estimated average cost ψ˜ iteratively. Accordingly,
we derive the following convergence result for Algorithm 1.
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Proposition 2. Let Assumption 1 and Assumption 2 hold,
and let (Θ0,Θ1, . . . ,Θ∞) be the sequence of the parameter
vectors generated by Algorithm 1 with a suitable step size ρ
satisfying Assumption 3, then ψ(Θm) converges and
lim
m→∞∇C(Θm) = 0, (28)
with probability one.
The proof of Proposition 2 is given in Appendix B.
5) Online learning algorithm: In Algorithm 1, to update
the value of the parameter vector Θ at the next visit to
the state s∗, we need to store all values of q˜Θm(st′ , at′)
and ∇µΘm (st′ ,at′ )µΘm (st′ ,at′ ) between two successive visits. However,
this method could result in a slow processing. Therefore,
we modify Algorithm 1 to improve the efficiency. First, we
rewrite Fm(Θm, ψ˜m) as follows:
Fm(Θm, ψ˜m) =
tm+1−1∑
t′=tm
q˜Θm(st′ , at′)
∇µΘm(st′ , at′)
µΘm(st′ , at′)
,
=
tm+1−1∑
t′=tm
∇µΘm(st′ , at′)
µΘm(st′ , at′)
tm+1−1∑
t=t′
(
fc(st, at)− ψ˜m
)
,
=
tm+1−1∑
t=tm
(
fc(st, at)− ψ˜m
)
zt+1,
(29)
where
zk+1 =
{ ∇µΘm (st,at)
µΘm (st,at)
, if t = tm,
zt +
∇µΘm (st,at)
µΘm (st,at)
, t = tm + 1, . . . , tm+1 − 1.
(30)
We then derive Algorithm 2, which is able to update the
parameter vector Θ at each time step as follows:
Algorithm 2 Algorithm to update Θ at each time step
At time step t, the state is st, and the values of Θt, zt, and
ψ˜(Θt) are available from the previous iteration. We update
zt, Θt, and ψ˜ according to:
zt+1 =

∇µΘt (st,at)
µΘt (st,at)
, if st = s∗
zt +
∇µΘt (st,at)
µΘk (st,at)
, otherwise,
(31)
Θt+1 = Θt − ρt
(
fc(st, at)− ψ˜t
)
zt+1, (32)
ψ˜t+1 = ψ˜t + κρt
(
fc(st, at)− ψ˜t
)
. (33)
In Algorithm 2, κ is a positive constant, ρt is the step size
of the algorithm, and ψ˜t can be expressed as the estimated
average cost of the PEV user at time step t.
D. Performance Evaluation
In this section, we perform simulations using MATLAB to
evaluate the performance of the proposed solution. We first
show the impact of the infrastructure information unavailabil-
ity to the cost of the PEV user. We then evaluate the benefits
of using cyber insurance for the V2G system. We will show
that, by using cyber insurance, the PEV user can reduce her
average cost for charging and increase her average profit for
discharging as well.
1) Cost due to V2G communication infrastructure unavail-
ability: We consider an area with the size of 10×10 km. The
positions of charging stations are fixed, while the position
of the PEV user will be located randomly in this area.
In Fig. 7, we show a topology to illustrate our simulation
in this section. There are 20 charging stations with fixed
locations, i.e., circles with numbered labels. The position of
the PEV user is located randomly at each simulation and it is
illustrated by a blue square in Fig. 7. There are three prices for
charging and discharging, i.e., 0.15, 0.2, 0.25 monetary units
(MUs), corresponding to three types of circles, i.e., empty
circles, circles with green large grids, and circles with red
vertical lines, respectively. For example, if the PEV goes to
a charging station which is illustrated by an empty circle, it
will pay/receive 0.15 MUs for charging/discharging energy,
respectively. The amount of energy to charge/discharge the
PEV battery is 60kWh, and the energy consumption is 200Wh
per km for traveling.
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Fig. 7. The topology setup.
In Fig. 8(a) and Fig. 8(b), we consider two scenarios,
i.e., when the PEV user wants to charge and discharge,
respectively. In the case when the infrastructure information
is unavailable, the PEV user will find the nearest charging
station for charging/discharging, while if the infrastructure
information is available, the PEV user will find a charging
station which minimizes its cost for charging or maximizes
its profit for discharging. The cost of the PEV for charging
is equal to the charging cost at the selected station plus
the traveling cost, while the discharging profit is equal to
the revenue of discharging at the selected station minus the
traveling cost. To obtain the average cost as well as the average
profit of the PEV user, we perform 50, 000 simulations to
calculate the average value. This means that given the topology
with a fixed number of stations, the position of the PEV is
generated randomly 50, 000 times to find the average value.
In Fig. 8, for the case without information, as the number of
stations is increased, the average charging cost and discharging
profit will be reduced. The reason is that given this topology,
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Fig. 8. (a) Average cost for charging and (b) average profit for discharging.
when the number of stations is increased, the probability which
the PEV user is near the stations with low price will be higher.
As a result, both the average charging cost and discharging
profit will be decreased in this case (since we set the charging
cost and discharging profit to be the same at a station).
However, in the case when the information is available, the
average cost/profit slightly increases/decreases as the number
of stations increases because the PEV user always can find the
best station for charging/discharging to minimize/maximize
its cost/profit. In both cases, it is observed that given the
infrastructure information, the average cost/profit of the PEV
user can be decreased/increased remarkably compared with the
case without information. This is from the fact that the PEV
has more choices to find a charging station which is not only
nearest, but also has the best energy price. This gain is referred
to as “value of information” which quantifies the benefit of the
V2G communication infrastructure.
However, for the case when the information about V2G
infrastructure is unavailable, e.g., due to cyber risks, the PEV
user incurs a high cost of charging and gains a low profit
from discharging. The cyber insurance can be implemented to
“transfer” the risks from the PEV user to the insurer. Under the
insurance coverage, the PEV user will be guaranteed the best
price for charging/discharging at any time. In the following,
we will demonstrate the efficiency of using cyber insurance to
the V2G system.
2) Benefits of cyber insurance to the V2G system:
a) Experiment setup: The PEV user has a battery with a
fixed capacity of 6, i.e., B = 6, e.g., extremely low, very
low, low, moderate, high, and very high levels. There are
four periods of time, e.g., morning, afternoon, evening, and
night, and there are two insurance status, i.e., insured and
not insured. The average charging price when the information
is available and unavailable over periods are [10.5, 10, 9.5, 9]
and [14.5, 14, 13.5, 13] MUs, respectively. Similarly, the av-
erage discharging prices when the information is avail-
able and unavailable over periods are [15.5, 15, 14.5, 14] and
[11.5, 11, 10.5, 10] MUs, respectively. In the first simulation,
i.e., Fig. 9, the energy consumption rate of the PEV user is
set at 0.6, the risk probability is 0.1, the premium cost is 1
MU, and the coverage period is 4 periods (i.e., ν = 4). The
values of these parameters will be varied later to evaluate the
efficiency of the proposed learning algorithm. Here, note that
when the information is unavailable and the PEV is under the
coverage, the PEV user will be charged at the same price when
the information is available.
In order to evaluate the efficiency of the proposed learning
algorithm, i.e., Algorithm 2, we consider two other schemes,
i.e., always insured policy (IP) and the policy without insur-
ance (WP). For the IP, the PEV will be always insured, i.e.,
the PEV will buy insurance every ν-period. For example, if
the PEV user buys insurance at time slot t = 1, then it will
buy insurance in time slots t = 1 + ν, 1 + 2ν, . . .. For both
policies, i.e., the IP and the WP, when the energy level is at
the lowest level, i.e., b = 1, the PEV user will always choose
action “charging” to avoid the heavy cost and prevent energy
depletion status. However, when the energy level is higher,
i.e., b ≥ 2, the PEV user will select randomly one of three
actions, i.e., “do nothing”, “charging”, or “discharging”. For
the learning algorithm, the value of the parameter vector Θ is
set at 0, i.e., the PEV user will select 2 actions, i.e., a1 and a2,
randomly at the beginning. In other words, at the beginning,
the PEV user will select actions “do nothing”, “charging”, and
“discharging” with the same probabilities, i.e., 13 , and actions
“buy insurance” and “do not buy insurance” with the same
probabilities, i.e., 12 . The initial average cost is set at 0.
b) Simulation results: In the simulation, we first show
the convergence through the average cost of the proposed
learning algorithm. As shown in Fig. 9(a), the average cost
of the proposed learning algorithm will converge to approx-
imately 3 when the number of iterations is 105, while the
IP and the WP converge to 4.7 and 4.6, respectively, after
5×104 iterations. This means that with the proposed learning
algorithm, the average cost for the PEV user can be reduced
approximately 34.5% compared with those of the IP and the
WP. The efficiency of the proposed learning algorithm can
be interpreted through the PEV user’s policy in Fig. 9(b).
In particular, for the learning algorithm, when the premium
cost is set at m = 1, the PEV user will buy insurance to be
insured almost all the time. However, different from the IP,
with the learning algorithm, the PEV user can balance among
“charging”, “discharging”, and ‘do nothing” actions to obtain
higher profits in discharging and lower cost in charging.
In Fig. 10, we vary the energy consumption rate of the PEV
user, while other parameters remain unchanged. As the energy
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Fig. 10. (a) Average total cost, (b) average cost for charging, and (c) average profit of discharging when the energy consumption rate is varied.
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Fig. 11. (a) Average total cost, (b) average insurance buying rate and (c) average profit of discharging when the unavailability information probability is
varied.
consumption rate increases, the average total costs obtained
by all policies will be increased as shown in Fig. 10(a)
because the PEV user needs more energy for its operation.
Since the PEV user needs more energy for its operation, the
average charging cost is increased as shown in Fig. 10(b).
Consequently, the discharging process will be reduced which
results in a lower discharging profit as shown in Fig. 10(c).
However, in all cases, the learning algorithm always achieves
the best performance in terms of the lowest cost for the PEV
user. In Fig. 10(a), there is a very interesting point that when
the energy consumption is less than 0.3, the average cost of
the learning algorithm is less than 0. The reason is that when
the energy demand is low, the PEV user still buys energy, i.e.,
charging, when the energy price is low, and then it will sell,
i.e., discharging, when the energy price is high, and thus it
can obtain more profits. As a result, the discharging profit is
higher than the charging cost (for the case with a low demand
of the PEV user), and thus the average total cost is lower than
zero.
We then vary the probability of information unavailability
and evaluate the average total cost and the insurance buying
rate of the PEV user. Interestingly, at the premium cost
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Fig. 12. (a) Average total cost, (b) average insurance buying rate, and (c) average insurance buying cost when the premium cost is varied.
m = 1 MU, when the probability of information unavailability
increases from 0.1 to 0.9, the average total cost of the WP
increases remarkably, while the average total costs of the IP
and learning algorithm do not change as shown in Fig. 11(a).
The reason can be explained through the insurance buying
policy of the learning algorithm shown in Fig. 11(b). In
particular, at a low premium cost, i.e., m = 1 MU for 4
periods, the PEV user will always choose to buy insurance
because under the coverage, the PEV user is guaranteed not
only the lowest price for charging, but also the highest price
for discharging. As a result, the discharging profit obtained by
the learning algorithm is always remained at a high level as
shown in Fig. 11(c), and thus the average cost obtained by
the learning algorithm is remained at a low level as shown in
Fig. 11(a).
Last, we vary the premium cost to evaluate the proposed
learning algorithm. In Fig. 12(a), as the premium cost in-
creases, the average total costs of the IP and the learning al-
gorithm increase remarkably. In particular, when the premium
cost is higher than 7 MUs, the average total cost obtained
by the learning algorithm is close to the average total cost
obtained by the WP. The reason is that when the premium
cost is too high, the cost to buy insurance will be high (as
shown in Fig. 12(c)), diminishing the profit obtained by the
insurance, e.g., reducing the charging cost and increasing
the discharging profit. Consequently, when the probability of
information unavailability is 0.1, if the premium cost is higher
than 5 MUs, the insurance buying rate obtained by the learning
algorithm will be reduced. This analysis is especially important
to the insurer to set an appropriate premium to maximize
its profits, while still attracting the PEV user in purchasing
insurance.
V. FUTURE RESEARCH DIRECTIONS OF CYBER
INSURANCE IN V2G SYSTEMS
In the following, we introduce some future research di-
rections of cyber insurance in V2G systems which not only
mitigate risks for PEV users, but also maximize the profit for
service providers.
A. Self-protection Strategy
Currently, we consider the case when the PEV user has only
two decisions, i.e., either to buy or not to buy insurance, to
mitigate the risk. However, in practice, the PEV user also can
implement self-protection solutions to deal with information
unavailability problem, e.g., using a backup energy storage
or employing a backup channel to communicate with the
V2G system. Thus, the PEV user has to decide to implement
its self-protection strategy, buy insurance, or do nothing. In
this case, cyber insurance models with self-protection strategy
introduced in Section III-F2 can be adopted to find the optimal
policy for the PEV user.
B. Multiple Insurers
There often exist multiple insurers in practice. Different
insurers may have different insurance policies with different
charging stations’ locations. Furthermore, different PEV users
may have different energy demand with different traveling
routines. Thus, how to find the best insurer to meet the PEV’s
requirements and how to set the best insurance price for an
insurer given its topology of charging stations are still open
questions. To address this problem, stochastic geometry and
graph theory can be used. For example, we can model the
spatial distribution of the charging stations of an insurer as an
α-Ginibre point process, and then given the location of a PEV
user, we can evaluate the performance for that PEV user in
terms of its average overall cost in a similar way as shown
in [55].
C. Smart Cyber Insurance Pricing
In all of the aforementioned scenarios, we assumed that the
energy provider is also the service provider, i.e., the insurer,
but they can be different entities in general. Consequently,
setting a premium is a challenge due to the conflict of interest
between the energy provider and the service provider as well
as among the service providers. To address this problem, smart
pricing strategies can be used. For example, the bundling
strategy introduced in [56] can be adopted by multiple ser-
vice providers to form a coalition and to offer their energy
insurance services as a bundle. With bundling, the profit of
the service providers can be improved by encouraging PEV
users to buy insurance, while the PEV users will be offered
more attractive services, e.g., they may have more charging
stations to choose from with better insurance prices.
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D. Cyber Insurance for V2G systems with Cognitive Radios
Due to a large number of PEV users, cognitive radios can be
considered to be a potential solution to address communication
problems for V2G networks [57]. In cognitive radio networks,
P2V users can communicate with V2G infrastructure through
primary channels as long as their communication does not
cause harmful interference to the primary users [58]. However,
for such networks, the PEV users’ communications are uncer-
tain depending on the primary users’ demands. Consequently,
the information unavailability due to the primary users’ com-
munications can cause loss to the PEV users. In this case,
cyber insurance can be used as an efficient economic solution
to protect the PEV users from risks caused by the information
unavailability.
VI. CONCLUSION
We have first presented a comprehensive overview on
Vehicle-to-Grid (V2G) systems and cyber insurance including
basic concepts, general architectures, advantages, and chal-
lenges for the development of V2G systems as well as cyber
insurance. We have also discussed potential solutions and
highlighted some promising future research directions for each
topic. Then, we have introduced a new idea of using cyber
insurance to mitigate information risks for the V2G system
with the aim to mitigate the loss and improve the profit for
the Plug-in-Electric Vehicle (PEV) user. In particular, we have
demonstrated that without V2G infrastructure information, the
average charging cost will be very high, while the average
discharging profit will be very low for the PEV user. In addi-
tion, we have proposed the learning algorithm which helps the
PEV user to make best decisions, i.e., charge/discharge energy
and buy/do not buy the insurance, at each time period in an
online fashion. Through simulations results, we have showed
that the proposed learning algorithm not only minimizes the
charging cost, but also maximizes the discharging profit for
the PEV user. Furthermore, we have also presented proofs
and simulation results to show the convergence of the learning
algorithm.
APPENDIX A
THE PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1
This is to show the gradient of the average cost. In (14),
we have
∑
s∈S piΘ(s) = 1, so
∑
s∈S ∇piΘ(s) = 0.
Recall that
d(s,Θ) = fc(s,Θ)− C(Θ) +
∑
s′∈S
pb(s
′|s,Ψ(Θ))d(s′,Θ),
and C(Θ) =
∑
s∈S
piΘ(s)fc(s,Θ).
Then, we derive the following results:
∇C(Θ) =
∑
s∈S
piΘ(s)∇fc(s,Θ) +
∑
s∈S
∇piΘ(s)fc(s,Θ),
=
∑
s∈S
piΘ(s)∇fc(s,Θ) +
∑
s∈S
∇piΘ(s)fc(s,Θ)−
C(Θ)
∑
s∈S
∇piΘ(s) (since
∑
s∈S
∇piΘ(s) = 0),
=
∑
s∈S
piΘ(s)∇fc(s,Θ) +
∑
s∈S
∇piΘ(s)
(
fc(s,Θ)− C(Θ)
)
,
=
∑
s∈S
piΘ(s)∇fc(s,Θ)+
∑
s∈S
∇piΘ(s)
(
d(s,Θ)−
∑
s′∈S
pb(s
′|s,Ψ(Θ))d(s′,Θ)
)
.
We define
∇
(
piΘ(s)pb(s
′|s,Ψ(Θ))
)
=
∇piΘ(s)pb(s′|s,Ψ(Θ)) + piΘ(s)∇pb(s′|s,Ψ(Θ)),
(34)
and from (14),
∑
s∈S piΘ(s)pb(s
′|s,Ψ(Θ)) = piΘ(s′). Then,
we have the derivations as given in (35) (next page).
The proof now is completed.
APPENDIX B
THE PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2
We will prove the convergence of the Algorithm 1. The
update equations of Algorithm 1 can be rewritten in the
specific form as in (36) (next page).
We define the vector rkm =
[
Θm ψ˜m
]>
, then (36)
becomes
rkm+1 = rkm + ρmHm, (37)
where
Hm=[ ∑tm+1−1
t′=tm
(∑tm+1−1
t=t′ (fc(st, at)− ψ˜m)
)∇µΘm (st′ ,at′ )
µΘm (st′ ,at′ )
κ
∑tm+1−1
t′=tm (fc(st, at)− ψ˜m)
]
.
(38)
Let F = {Θ0, ψ˜0, s0, s1, . . . , sm} be the history of the
Algorithm 1. Then from Proposition 2 in [51], we have
E[Hm|Fm]=hm=
[
EΘ[T ]∇C(Θ) + V (Θ)
(C(Θ)− ψ˜(Θ))
κEΘ[T ]
(C(Θ)− ψ˜(Θ))
]
,
(39)
where
V (Θ) = EΘ
[
tm+1−1∑
t′=tm+1
(
tm+1 − t′
)∇µΘm(st′ , at′)
µΘm(st′ , at′)
]
.
Consequently, (37) has the following form
rkm+1 = rkm + ρmhm + εm, (40)
where εm = ρ(Hm−hm) and note that E[εm|Fm] = 0. Since
εm and ρm converge to zero almost surely, along with the fact
that hm is bounded, we have
lim
m→∞(r
km+1 − rkm) = 0. (41)
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∇C(Θ) =
∑
s∈S
piΘ(s)∇C(Θ) +
∑
s∈S
∇piΘ(s)
(
d(s,Θ)−
∑
s′∈S
pb(s
′|s,Ψ(Θ))d(s′,Θ)
)
=
∑
s∈S
piΘ(s)∇C(Θ) +
∑
s∈S
∇piΘ(s)d(s,Θ) +
∑
s,s′∈S
(
piΘ(s)∇pb(s′|s,Ψ(Θ))−∇
(
piΘ(s)∇pb(s′|s,Ψ(Θ))
))
d(s′,Θ)
=
∑
s∈S
piΘ(s)∇C(Θ) +
∑
s∈S
∇piΘ(s)d(s,Θ) +
∑
s,s′∈S
piΘ(s)∇pb(s′|s,Ψ(Θ))d(s′,Θ)−∑
s′∈S
∇
(∑
s∈S
piΘ(s)pb(s
′|s,Ψ(Θ))
)
d(s′,Θ)
=
∑
s∈S
piΘ(s)∇C(Θ) +
∑
s∈S
∇piΘ(s)d(s,Θ) +
∑
s,s′∈S
piΘ(s)∇pb(s′|s,Ψ(Θ))d(s′,Θ)−
∑
s′∈S
∇piΘ(s′)d(s′,Θ)
=
∑
s∈S
piΘ(s)
(
∇C(Θ) +
∑
s′∈S
∇pb(s′|s,Ψ(Θ))d(s′,Θ)
)
(35)
Θm+1 = Θm + ρm
(
tm+1−1∑
t′=tm
( tm+1−1∑
t=t′
(fc(st, at)− ψ˜m)
)∇µΘm(st′ , at′)
µΘm(st′ , at′)
)
,
ψ˜m+1 = ψ˜m + κρm
tm+1−1∑
t′=tm
(fc(st, at)− ψ˜m)
(36)
After that, based on Lemma 11 in [51], it is proved that
ψ(Θ) and ψ˜(Θ) converge to a common limit. This means the
parameter vector Θ can be represented in the following way
Θm+1 = Θm + ρmEΘm [T ]
(∇C(Θm) + em)+ m, (42)
where em is an error term that converges to zero and m is
a summable sequence. (42) is known as the gradient method
with diminishing errors [59], [60]. Therefore, following the
same way in [59], [60], we can prove that ∇C(Θm) converges
to 0, i.e., ∇ΘC(Θ∞) = 0.
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